Paragraph 1 | We must inquire generally, whether eternal things can consist of elements. |
Paragraph 2 | There are some who describe the element which acts with the One as an indefinite dyad, and object to 'the unequal', reasonably enough, because of the ensuing difficulties; |
Paragraph 3 | There are many causes which led them off into these explanations, and especially the fact that they framed the difficulty in an obsolete form. |
Paragraph 4 | "'For never will this he proved, that things that are not are.' |
Paragraph 5 | They thought it necessary to prove that that which is not is; |
Paragraph 6 | But, first, if 'being' has many senses (for it means sometimes substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes that it is of a certain quantity, and at other times the other categories), what sort of 'one', then, are all the things that are, if non-being is to be supposed not to be? |
Paragraph 7 | Secondly, of what sort of non-being and being do the things that are consist? |
Paragraph 8 | The question evidently is, how being, in the sense of 'the substances', is many; |
Paragraph 9 | They should have asked this question also, how relative terms are many and not one. |
Paragraph 10 | It is necessary, then, as we say, to presuppose for each thing that which is it potentially; |
Paragraph 11 | But further, if the 'this' and the quantitative are not the same, we are not told how and why the things that are are many, but how quantities are many. |
Paragraph 12 | One might fix one's attention also on the question, regarding the numbers, what justifies the belief that they exist. |