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| Paragraph 1 |
Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall
be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when
standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct
us. |
| Paragraph 2 |
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid
down, something other than these necessarily comes about
through them. |
| Paragraph 3 |
(a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premisses from which the
reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our
knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are
primary and true: |
| Paragraph 4 |
(b) reasoning, on the other hand, is
'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are generally
accepted. |
| Paragraph 5 |
(c), reasoning is
'contentious' if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally
accepted, but are not really such, or again if it merely seems to
reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. |
| Paragraph 6 |
Further (d), besides all the
reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start
from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for
example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. |
| Paragraph 7 |
The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of
reasoning. |
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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26